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Introduction
On Wednesday, September 4, 2002, the Oakland Athletics were preparing to host the
Kansas City Royals—except this was not just a typical Wednesday night. The Athletics were on
a nineteen-game winning streak, and one more win would vault them ahead of the 1947 New
York Yankees and 1906 Chicago White Sox into the Major League Baseball (MLB) record
books with the longest winning streak in American League (AL) history. Entering the night,
Oakland led the season series against the Royals, though five out of eight games were decided by
one run. (“2002 Oakland Athletics Schedule”) After scoring six runs in the first inning, one run
in the second inning, and four runs in the third inning, the game felt like Oakland’s to lose.
(“Royals vs. Athletics - Game Summary - September 4, 2002”) After all, it couldn’t be hard to
protect an eleven-run lead over six innings since many different factors would have to conspire
at once; but crazy things happen in sports. What the rest of that night had in store was so far out
of left field, that nobody would have believed it until they saw it themselves.
Over the next five innings, the Royals scored eleven unanswered runs to tie the game by
the bottom of the ninth. (“Royals vs. Athletics - Game Summary - September 4, 2002”) All hope
seemed lost for the Athletics, as everyone thought they would suffer the largest comeback in
MLB history and be remembered as the team that missed history in a historic way. After a
leadoff fly out, manager Art Howe called on first baseman Scott Hatteberg to pinch-hit, needing
any spark for a late rally with the goal being to put the winning run on first base. The lefty took a
first-pitch ball from Kansas City reliever Jason Grimsley, and then sent the following pitch over
the right-centerfield wall and transported everyone through one of the most romantic walk-off
endings in Athletics and MLB history. (“Royals vs. Athletics - Game Summary - September 4,
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2002”) The homerun gave Oakland a one-run victory to set the new AL record with twenty
consecutive wins.
By the end of the season, they won 103 games and the AL West division title. Oakland
felt confident entering the first round of the playoffs against the Minnesota Twins. Unfazed by
regular season inferiority, the Twins defeated the Athletics in their best-of-five game series. A
franchise that had been waiting since 1989 for a World Series title (and 1990 for an appearance)
was forced to wait at least one more year to end either of these droughts (which are still active to
date). On top of that, the Athletics have not won 100 games again since 2002. (“MLB Team
History - Oakland Athletics Season Results”) As difficult as that is to do, since the 2002 season,
MLB has seen twenty-four teams win at least 100 games, including fifteen since 2015. (“100-win
seasons in Major League Baseball”) Evidently, teams have reached this milestone more
frequently in the modern age than when analytical baseball was first born, demonstrating a
positive relationship between attention to statistics and regular season success.
Nevertheless, the Athletics hit an unmatched high in the early 2000s and left some fans
wondering what carried them to that point and why they haven’t repeated that success. The short
answer is statistics; the long answer spans over 150 years through the history of professional
baseball in the United States. However, the concept of analytical baseball never fully took shape
in MLB until Oakland general manager Billy Beane acted on the simple objective of improving a
lowly franchise.
To combat the inheritance of a subpar roster and low payroll, Beane became Oakland’s
general manager entering the 1998 season needing to reshape the culture and find a new way to
build a competitive team with meager resources. Luckily, he did not have to look far to find the
next big thing: he just had to look where nobody else did. This is when data-driven baseball and
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the “Moneyball” mindset were born. A seemingly simple concept in “identifying and using
undervalued assets to create and sustain a competitive edge” suddenly changed the course of
MLB. (“Billy Beane”) Beane challenged longstanding stereotypes surrounding scouting methods
and talent evaluation by employing statistical strategies to find undiscovered, yet affordable
advantages. In this, Beane trailblazed a league-wide trend of data mining as the desire,
accessibility, and volume of baseball statistics reached unprecedented heights with advancing
technology. Although, it is important to note that Beane was not the first man to incorporate
statistics into baseball operations. He falls in a long line of proponents of an analytical movement
that predates the creation of MLB in 1869.
In this paper, I will examine the integration of baseball into American culture and
statistics’ involvement in that process. A consistent theme throughout the history of baseball in
America is the application of data that educates and expands the sport’s national and global
scope. MLB is the premier professional baseball league with thirty franchises and a myriad of
ways in which numbers drive public absorption and appreciation of the sport. The numerous
contributors to this movement each worked with what they had, which naturally increased over
time, and all shared the presence of mind to turn an overlooked idea into a core element of a
longtime staple of American sports history.
This chronology starts before the invention of computers and runs through the worldwide
growth of technology, the dawn of “Moneyball” in the early twenty-first century, and the MLB’s
implementation of Statcast and other new technology since 2015. There are no specific dates that
precisely define these stages of the movement, but they are important because they reflect the
evolving state of baseball and its broader connection to society.
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This paper will paint a clear picture of the emergence and acceptance of analytics in
baseball through a gradual transformation of the style of play spanning the past few decades in
the form of increased strikeouts, homeruns, and extra-base hits. The effects of technology are
evident, but credit for the intuition behind this movement goes to those that did not have nearly
as many resources to work with. Before computers aided with calculating and storing standard
and advanced metrics, a few passionate fans were relied upon to gather and communicate the
meaning of numbers that explained what happened on the field. The capacity for understanding
of the sport increased dramatically due to innovation driven by individual minds long before the
presence of technology.
Furthermore, this paper will explore the polarizing implications of analytical baseball on
and off the field. Nowadays, players have more insight than ever into their performance and
mechanics in a game where statistics powerfully influence offensive and defensive approaches to
every pitch. The overarching objective of adopting analytic-based strategies is to improve overall
performance and win more games, but the saturation of data in baseball has invoked unintended
consequences including slower pace of play, less on-field action, and a profoundly controversial
product of baseball. One of the main questions that this paper will explore is whether or not
MLB can go too far with its statistic-minded initiative (if it has not already). There are legitimate
arguments on both sides of the current and projected power dynamic of analytics, sparking an
ongoing conversation that puts MLB in a fragile position trying to balance traditional aspects of
the sport with the modern data wave washing over it.
Literature Review
Professional baseball has long been dubbed as America’s national pastime for its purity,
symbolism, and sentiment of tradition cherished by fans. The sport was ingrained into American
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culture in the early twentieth century after a commission was appointed to establish baseball as
an American game and refute its alleged European roots. (Davies 54) This commission included
two United States senators and was created under the recommendation of Albert Spalding, a
former pitcher and manager for the Chicago White Stockings and founder of American sports
equipment manufacturing company Spalding. They based their claims off of an old handwritten
letter stating that the written rules of baseball were conceived in Cooperstown, New York (where
the National Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum resides). (Davies 54) This countered more
obvious facts that baseball came from overseas as an evolution of the English game “rounders”.
Despite this historical ignorance, the patriotic element of this fabrication compelled Americans
to accept this story over the European version and take pride in calling baseball their game. From
there, it was only a matter of time before baseball became an immovable aspect of American life:
Over the years, baseball became intimately embedded in the American consciousness
through the arts – theater, newspaper, song, film, radio, television, poetry, and novel. It
also provided the medium for animated conversations (and arguments) in the daily flow
of public and private discourse, and its images became embedded in the common
language. (Davies 53)
Bartlett Giamatti was one individual who carried himself with the passionate spirit for
baseball that invigorated many Americans. As a former commissioner of Organized Baseball and
Boston Red Sox fan, Giamatti had skin in the game and understood the heart-wrenching lifestyle
that came with having a favorite team. However, even when the Red Sox lost, his devotion to the
game lived on due to the sport’s liveliness and seasonal synchrony: “ ‘It breaks your heart. It is
designed to break your heart. The game begins in spring, when everything else begins again, and
it blossoms in the summer, filling the afternoons and evenings, and then as soon as the chill rains
come, it stops and leaves you in fall alone.’ ” (Davies 53) Giamatti knew as well as anyone how
it felt to root for a favorite team and endure the up-and-down journey of a long season.
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Close emotional attachment is a large part of what keeps people coming back to play or
watch baseball. Every season presents a new window of opportunity and optimism with a blank
slate. Opening Day, which is usually at the end of March or start of April, is often associated
with images such as clean dirt, fresh trimmed grass, pure white baselines, and the natural beauty
of the start of spring. Going to the ballpark to watch a game can be a meaningful experience for
anyone—regardless of baseball knowledge—because of the perceived authenticity of the sport.
While this consensus viewpoint was deliberately concocted at the expense of the history behind
baseball’s arrival to America, it portrays a passionate national spirit and love for the game.
In addition to raw admiration, the other big factor that captures public interest is analytics
that fuel a fascination for what happens beyond the field and enable deeper insight into the sport.
MLB is placing statistics at the forefront of their marketing campaign in a society consumed by
advanced technology. In 2014, the league partnered with Amazon Web Services (AWS) and
their Statcast technology. (Kelly) Former AWS vice president of worldwide commercial sales
Mike Clayville explained the company’s role in MLB’s efforts to make the game more engaging
and interactive for fans:
‘MLB has been collecting statistical data on its players and clubs for decades, and turned
to AWS in 2015 to take its game-day stats to the next level, so that fans can dig deeper
into advanced metrics that ultimately enhance enjoyment of the game.’ ... ‘AWS has the
broadest and deepest portfolio of cloud services with the best security and proven
operational expertise, which is why MLB chose to work with the world's leading cloud to
build, run and enhance Statcast™.’ (Kelly)
In 2018, AWS announced that it will continue its partnership with MLB on a deeper level
by becoming the league’s official provider for machine learning, artificial intelligence, and deep
learning workloads. Jason Gaedtke, MLB’s chief technology officer, explains how MLB chose
AWS for “their strength, depth and proven expertise in delivering machine learning services.”
(Kelly) This added technology helped MLB automate its record-keeping process for dynamic

Sorgi 7
sabermetric analysis that “ ‘[took] understanding of the game to a whole new level for... fans and
the 30 clubs.’ ” (Kelly) Innovation like Statcast makes teams and fans much smarter with more
statistics available at one’s fingerprints than ever before.
A couple years later, MLB switched to Google Cloud as a new data and analytics partner.
Commissioner Rob Manfred saw great potential in partnering with Google Cloud and their
technology that could tap into a more personalized and immersive experience. This initiative was
bolstered by the wondrous possibilities and power of real-time analytics in a world increasingly
driven by data. The league’s commitment to Statcast was not lost with its AWS partnership,
seeing as it has become “indispensable for fans, players, coaches, umpires, and broadcasters”.
(“MLB”) In line with AWS, Google Cloud paid major dividends in using big data to make the
common fan more knowledgeable and fascinated in baseball.
For as long as statistics have been involved in the sport, this has been a common theme as
individuals and teams made discoveries and tested the bounds of tradition. This process was
much more gradual before the twenty-first century for two main reasons: nonexistent or inferior
technology, and it was harder to accept new theories that challenged longstanding structures and
stereotypes. Statistics posed a threat to the familiar way of doing things—especially to managers
and front offices featuring former players. This paper will traverse the extensive timeline from
when statistical analysis was first applied to baseball to the positive and negative modern
implications of data’s evolving presence and purpose in the sport.
Statistics Stepping Up to the Plate
Professional baseball was not always deeply rooted in the statistics that arise after every
pitch and play. Baseball needed a push in the right direction to land on the map and make a
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stronger impression among the American people. However, that push did not come from a
fanatic of baseball with a lifelong passion or any prior background in the sport. Instead, the credit
goes to an English cricket player that changed how fans understood the sport in a place where
nobody thought to look: the numbers.
Henry Chadwick is the father of statistical analysis in baseball. He came to America from
England at the age of twelve and became a famous cricket player in New York City. Later, he
became a newspaper reporter covering local sports, which played into his discovery of baseball.
In 1856, Chadwick saw a game between the Brooklyn Eagles and New York Gothams—two
topnotch teams—and had a light bulb moment. Not only did he appreciate the talent of those
teams, but also the value of baseball as a sport. In his Sports in American Life: A History,
Richard Davies cites Chadwick’s newfound passion for baseball: “ ‘The game was being sharply
played on both sides and I watched it with deeper interest than any previous [baseball] match that
I had seen... I was struck with the idea that [baseball] was just the game for a national sport for
Americans.’ ” (Davies 58) Chadwick’s conversion from cricket to baseball symbolized opposing
trends for the two sports in the United States: cricket was waning, and it was only a matter of
time before baseball take its place.
With this mindset, the most suitable strategy that Chadwick thought would help baseball
grow was to use statistics to show how the game worked and thoroughly evaluate each player.
After all, countable events converted into statistics are the most direct testament to players’ talent
because they turn on-field happenings into straightforward calculations from which to derive
greater conclusions. In 1859, Chadwick introduced a box score displaying a detailed summary of
each game. (Lewis 69) An improvement from the original invention of the box score in 1845,
Chadwick’s version included statistics like runs, hits, and errors, as well as an inning-by-inning
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line score. (Davies 59) These figures are commonplace today but were innovative in the midnineteenth century. Syncing baseball with the changing times enabled its rise in popularity by
responding to the call for a standardized system of rules and scoring. Chadwick served on a
committee that established uniform rules for baseball that, under his influence, “settled on the
number of innings that constituted a game (nine), the player roster (also nine) and how many
balls and strikes were permitted.” (Martin) In 1860, he began editing Beadle’s Dime Base-Ball
Player, an annual publication that chronicled everything Chadwick knew about baseball. This
effort bore “baseball’s first statistician, [and] perhaps [Chadwick’s] most enduring contribution,
because no sport places such a premium on statistics.” (Martin) While the types of statistics that
teams valued changed over time, contemporary statistical models resemble Chadwick’s original
concepts. Through his early contributions, Chadwick became the spark for a statistical revolution
that would frame everyone’s perception of the game.
Analytics On (and In) the Air
After Chadwick’s breakthrough, baseball underwent several changes to make the sport
more appealing to its fans as rules, language, and general understanding evolved over the years.
The first game broadcasted on television was on August 26, 1939, and set into motion a
“[fundamental] change [to] the relationship between sports and society.” (Maney) Baseball
games had been recapped in newspapers since the end of the nineteenth century and broadcasted
on the radio since the 1920s, but television greatly widened baseball’s audience by enabling fans
to watch games from home. Technology moved forward such that “In 1950, 9 percent of U.S.
homes had a TV. Only 12 years later, it was 90 percent.” (Maney) This innovation called for
individuals with advanced knowledge of the game, such as former players and knowledgeable
analysts, to commentate what happened on the field to inform viewers at home. During the early
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stages of television broadcasts, which coincided with an expanding MLB fanbase, baseball saw
its next great contributor towards the analytics movement on the field and in the broadcast booth.
Allan Roth brought forth a new perspective to baseball that paid major dividends towards
teams’ approaches and strategies and fans’ absorption of the sport. The kickstart to Roth’s career
came when he joined the Brooklyn Dodgers as a statistician under president Branch Rickey.
(McCue) Roth wanted to track numerous statistics and categorize his findings to establish player
trends and formulate smarter insights. A preliminary meeting with Rickey did not go very well,
but a four-page letter detailing Roth’s proposal opened Rickey’s eyes to statistical ideologies that
were not so outlandish. To Roth, “ ‘Baseball is a game of percentages—I try to find the actual
percentage, which is constantly shifting, and apply it to the situation where it will do the [best].’”
(McCue) Unlike Chadwick, who tracked countable statistics dissected from watching games,
Roth focused on unconventional statistics that changed behind the scenes.
If precedent suggested that statistics worked in a stop-and-go manner like the sport, then
Roth upended that notion by setting data into perpetual motion. For example, he created the
spray chart, which illustrates where players hit the ball using percentages. Batting average—an
older statistic—strictly calculates the amount of hits from at-bats, whereas the spray chart takes
every batted ball and returns frequencies of where the ball travels off the bat. This allows players
and coaches to learn more about hitting tendencies. For instance, if a right-handed hitter hits
several balls to the right side of the field, it likely means that his bat-speed is slow, and he needs
to get around on the ball faster. In the modern world, spray charts are visually featured during
several television broadcasts; but in the mid-1900s, this was an odd statistic that few people
tracked not due to skepticism in its merits, but a lack of real evidence of its impact on player
performance and team success.
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In 1954, Roth was moved from the dugout to the broadcast booth, where he made strides
providing commentators timely and informative data that created a newly interactive experience
for fans at home and fellow broadcasters. It did not take long for Roth to catch the attention of
Dodgers announcer Vin Scully, who was amazed by the wide range of questions that Roth could
answer during games: “ ‘If you had some question that came to you in the middle of a game, he
would reach down into the bag, and the next thing you knew you’d have your answer. It was
marvelous.’ ” (McCue) Roth infused the typical fan’s viewpoint with different numbers and
information to strengthen the viewer’s eye to comprehend more of what happened every play.
This was pivotal to the analytics movement because it added a new dimension to the versatility
of data from strictly benefitting teams and players to spectators that would not learn as much
without it.
When Roth moved back to the dugout, a big difference emerged in how the team used his
findings. Initially, Roth’s work only went to Rickey, the team president; now, managers and
players incorporated his data towards game strategy and individual improvement. One particular
application of Roth’s data was on September 18, 1959. Entering a doubleheader against the San
Francisco Giants in which the Dodgers needed two wins for any chance at the World Series,
manager Walt Alston planned on pitching Don Drysdale in the afternoon game and Roger Craig
in the night game. (McCue) However, Roth raised the fact that Drysdale pitched considerably
better at night than during the day, while Craig showed no significant difference. On that note,
Alston switched Craig to the afternoon and Drysdale to the night. As a result, the Dodgers won
both games that day, and later won the 1959 World Series. The Dodgers may have still won if
Alston did not make this change, but Roth’s data presented evidence of the best projected path to
victory and ultimately turned that projection into reality.
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One player that used Roth’s data was pitcher Sandy Koufax, who credited his integration
of off-speed pitches and emphasis on first pitch strikes to spring training sessions with Roth in
the early 1960s. (McCue) These sessions were worthwhile because from 1962 to 1966, Koufax
was nearly unstoppable. He improved in several statistical metrics and led MLB in more of them
in those five seasons than during his previous seven seasons. To name a few, he led the National
League (NL) in earned run average, won the NL Cy Young Award three times (given to the best
pitcher in the NL), and won or finished runner-up for the Most Valuable Player Award three
times. (“Sandy Koufax Stats”) Koufax was also inducted into the National Baseball Hall of Fame
in 1972. When push comes to shove, the numbers never lie; it’s how people use them that can
make the greatest difference.
Looking back, it is no wonder that the Dodgers won the 1959 World Series, but this
raises one question: Why had more teams not tried something like this before? The short answer
is that there was no significant precedent. Roth was a trailblazer because he was one of the first
statisticians to use television to expand the audience of his findings. He looked for any way that
statistics could fuel competitive advantages on the field or educate viewers on the air. Roth sat in
on national broadcasts for NBC and ABC and consulted for twenty major league teams, which is
a lot considering that MLB never had thirty teams until 1998. His contributions vaulted MLB to
new heights in performance, philosophy, and awareness. In the words of Bill James, an eventual
proponent of this movement, “ ‘He was the guy who began it all’ ... ‘He took statisticians into a
brave new world.’ ” (McCue) This was the beginning for analytics as people devised new ways
to apply data towards baseball research that studied broader topics around the sport.
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Sabermetric Studies Surge
While Roth took data to a whole new level, its practicality was limited until people found
creative off-field applications for it. That changed after Robert Davids founded the Society for
American Baseball Research (SABR) on August 10, 1971. (Thompson and Hufford) Davids
received a journalism degree at the University of Missouri in 1949, and later became a freelance
contributor to The Sporting News, a sports journalism publication. Davids’ passion was baseball,
but The Sporting News felt otherwise when transitioning to an all-sports publication and reducing
baseball publishing efforts. In line with other efforts towards the continuance of baseball
research, the call for an organization like SABR arose. Just less than a decade later, the Society
became an entity after Davids wrote a letter on March 19, 1971, to thirty-two people interested in
baseball research. The audience size was not important; rather, Davids’ goal was to orchestrate a
preliminary meeting at the National Baseball Hall of Fame with people who shared a passion for
baseball. In the letter, he outlined the following objectives for Cooperstown:
(1) to see Cooperstown and the always changing Hall of Fame Museum; (2) to meet and
exchange [first-hand] views with other [statisticians]; (3) to review specific areas of
baseball interest to avoid duplication of effort; (4) to establish an informal group
primarily for exchange of information; or (5) to establish a formal organization with
officers, dues, a charter, annual meetings, etc.; (6) to consider the establishment of a
publication in which our research efforts could be presented; and (7) to take up additional
matters which you may suggest in response to this letter. (qtd. in Thompson and Hufford)
Fifteen people joined Davids in founding SABR and committed themselves to five overarching
objectives that shaped the long-term future of the organization:
1. To foster the study of baseball as a significant American social and athletic
institution.
2. To establish an accurate account of baseball through the years.
3. To facilitate the dissemination of baseball research information.
4. To stimulate the best interests of baseball as our national pastime.
5. To cooperate in safeguarding the proprietary interests of individual research efforts of
members of the Society. (Thompson and Hufford)
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Originally, not many people paid attention to this small group of baseball fanatics; now,
membership exceeds 7,000 people, including “prominent authors, researchers, sabermetricians,
former players and executives, and baseball fans.” (“Society for American Baseball Research”)
As membership grew, so did the Society’s significance towards the baseball world. Its realm of
research encompasses more than statistics: “SABR publishes other books on baseball and
reprints some hard-to-find materials of high historical interest. SABR also hosts a number of
specialized research committees dealing with specific topics.” (“Society for American Baseball
Research”) Their biannual Baseball Research Journal contains expansive collections of original
baseball research, and the SABR Baseball Biography Project collects biographies of all players
and managers that have appeared in MLB, as well as other important individuals towards the
history of baseball.
Additionally, the Society has expanded across American borders via regional chapters in
places such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and Japan, which regularly exchange original
research and personal anecdotes among those connected to the game. (“Society for American
Baseball Research”) Since its founding day, SABR laid the groundwork for the exposure of
baseball research beyond small gatherings like the one that founded the organization. Statistical
analysis took off as membership of the Society symbolized a growing interest in baseball. In fact,
SABR’s acronym inspired statistician Bill James to coin the term “sabermetrics” to define the
study of baseball research. His original definition of sabermetrics was the “search for objective
knowledge about baseball,” which is accurate considering how sabermetrics have evolved over
the past few decades. (Rand) Statistics factor into baseball knowledge in many ways, and James’
research sought to generate a deeper apprehension of the sport by manually compiling data to
discern messages communicated from the data.
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Extracting the Potency of Statistics
Bill James pioneered the practicality of sabermetrics at the right time to enter the
mainstream and exponentially grow. He studied economics and literature at the University of
Kansas before falling in love with baseball to the point where everything he wrote somehow
involved baseball: “ ‘I’d probably be a writer if there was no such thing as baseball,’ ... ‘but
because there is such a thing as [baseball,] I can’t imagine writing about anything else.’ ” (Lewis
65) His first publication, 1977 Baseball Abstract: Featuring 18 Categories of Statistical
Information That You Just Can’t Find Anywhere Else, was essentially sixty-eight pages of
baseball statistics. James’ annual Baseball Abstract publications became his way of expressing
his perception of MLB. As he wrote in his 1985 Baseball Abstract, he only cared about statistics
because “baseball statistics, unlike the statistics in any other area, have acquired the powers of
language.” (qtd. in Lewis, 64) The more that people use statistics, the more that those numbers
come to life and influence how the game is understood; this, according to James, is where many
go wrong.
Numbers directly attest to player performance, but people’s interpretations of them are
skewed by subjective judgement of what they say—and have been for a long time. James had a
unique philosophy of statistics, as Michael Lewis details in Moneyball: The Art of Winning an
Unfair Game: “The statistics were not merely inadequate; they lied. And the lies they told led the
people who ran [MLB] teams to misjudge their players, and mismanage their games.” (Lewis 67)
Statistics do not say anything, yet people derive intuitive (sometimes misled) conclusions while
giving them meaning towards winning and building better teams. Using statistics to win more
games opens a Pandora’s box that propels the power of statistics to great heights:
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‘When the numbers acquire the significance of language,’ ... ‘they acquire the power to
do all of the things which language can do: to become fiction and drama and poetry. ...
And it is not just baseball that these numbers, through a fractured mirror, describe. It is
character. It is psychology... history... power... grace, glory, consistency, sacrifice,
courage... success and failure... frustration and bad luck... ambition... overreaching...
discipline. And it is victory and defeat, which is all that the idiot sub-conscious really
understands.’ (Lewis 67)
James redefined what statistics conveyed by saying that they don’t convey anything at all.
Take the error, a statistic that reflects the number of times that players miss makeable plays.
According to James, if a player misses a makeable play, then he must have done something right
to put himself in a proper position to make the play. That makes the error a statistic rooted in
opinion. (Lewis 66) This argument makes sense because the fielder does something right in
creating a manageable situation to make the correct play; while the miss is an error in execution,
the statistic accounting for the error is recorded through the subjectivity of a scorekeeper judging
the fielder’s ability in that moment. In this, the error is not an objective statistic beneficial for
constructive analysis; rather, it is centered around the subjective assessment of occasional faults.
This influences fans’ perceptions of what happens on defense by magnifying situational mistakes
that detract from a more wholistic understanding of the game that accounts for everything else
that happens on the field.
Dating back as far as Chadwick, spectators have compiled statistics to make sense of the
unexplained and show what players do that factor into their performance. However, when people
attach false meaning to statistics accrued through merely watching games, they lose objectivity
by reaching intuitive conclusions that can misguide strategy and talent evaluation. Although he
had less resources to work with, Chadwick instigated this misinterpretation by “creating a central
role for statistics in baseball, but in doing [so creating] the greatest accounting scandal in
professional sports.” (Lewis 71) In essence, James’ message is that people undermine their
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intentions for using statistics, albeit unintentional, through the ways in which they value certain
statistics over others.
Call to the (Technological) Bullpen
James experienced a slow start with his first Baseball Abstract in 1977, but advances in
computer technology and a spike in players’ salaries accelerated the awareness of his work. A
considerable amount of the progress made with sabermetrics would not have happened nearly as
rapidly—or been possible—without computers. Richard Schell examines the role of technology
since 1971, the year that SABR was founded:
Sabermetrics developed alongside the information age, with personal computers enabling
those who did not work where computers were... available to develop their algorithms
and analyze data at home. The Internet spawned websites and blogs, connecting people
and enabling them to gather and store vast amounts of data. Sabermetrics has gone from
something a passionate few studied to something millions access and understand. (Schell)
The power of statistical analysis ultimately rests on the sample size of statistics to work with.
Computers quicken the processing and storage of big data and amplify the organization of vast
amounts of statistics. SABR member George T. Wiley cited computers as “The most significant
development in the use of statistics over the past 25 years” in an article published in the 1976
Baseball Research Journal. (Wiley) He notes the substantial impact of computers on statistical
analysis below:
Mathematical computations that formerly took hours to do by hand are completed by the
computer in seconds. Masses of statistical information are now being analyzed in ways
never before thought possible. In addition, when such statistical information is extensive
and uniformly organized, cause-effect relationships can be determined with amazing
accuracy. Baseball statistics clearly fit the definition of ‘extensive and uniformly
organized.’ (Wiley)
This rapid statistical expansion became even more vital when players’ salaries increased
because it enhanced the gravity of smarter financial decision-making. Assessments of players’
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value affects how much teams choose to pay them. Data formulates more informed decisions
because it paints a well-rounded picture of talent to complement what scouts and front offices
see. The importance of wise financial and scouting decisions grew in proportion to the climb of
team salary caps. With next-level insights, everybody eventually wanted whatever numbers they
could get, though only a few immediately turned to analytics because it piloted unproven tactics
that challenged expertise built on years of experience in the game. Fanatics and analysts
practically salivated over this new data, but it took some convincing to get stubborn managers on
board because it felt like an attack on their grasp of the game. This resistance remained a trend
across most of MLB until one manager took a leap of faith that changed the direction of his
organization and how the world viewed analytics.
Dawn of “Moneyball”
The 2002 season saw MLB’s first tangible domino effect of analytics. General manager
Billy Beane and the Oakland Athletics piloted the implementation of analytical-based methods
and first adopted the “Moneyball” approach. Beane had been in baseball for a long time, as it
was his own experience that guided how he managed the Athletics. During his high school days,
baseball scouts looked for five skills: running, throwing, fielding, hitting for contact, and hitting
for power. (Lewis 1) Beane was a prototypical five-tool player, and this traditional mindset lured
every scout towards Beane. Sky-high expectations carried him to the pros, but soon let him down
after the New York Mets drafted him with the twenty-third pick in the 1980 MLB Draft. Nobody
thought to look at Beane’s statistics, and that came back to bite the Mets after investing a high
draft pick on him. Beane looked so good that “[Everyone] missed all the clues. They didn’t
notice, for instance, that Billy’s batting average collapsed from over .500 in his junior year to
just over .300 in his senior year.” (Lewis 9) In this, Beane’s own path taught him that there is
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more to players’ value than what meets the eye, and that was how he knew that traditional
scouting was not going to tip the scales in Oakland.
Entering Beane’s tenure, the classic assumption was that teams with larger payrolls could
afford more experienced and higher-rated players and, thus, had better chances of success. The
Athletics radically upended that notion: “In 1999, the A’s ranked 11th of the 14 AL teams in
payroll and fifth in games won. By 2002, its total payroll had fallen to 12th in the league, but the
team had moved to first place in games won. The A’s first-place spot was an unprecedented
outcome.” (Allen and Seaman) Beane trusted statistics from computers, primarily on-base
percentage, and used them to create a more competitive team, identify undervalued players, and
reach the playoffs despite a low budget. Since then, Moneyball became baseball’s worst kept
secret as teams raced to invest new resources and departments in sabermetrics. As if overnight,
tradition was out, and analytics were in. As Bill James once said regarding analytical baseball, “
‘It’s happening, and it’s not going to stop.’ ” (Rand) Thanks to modern technology and proof of
success, that statement will long remain true.
The Numbers Game: How It Adds Up
Since 2002, analytics have only grown in the number of people using it and its practical
applications. In 2014, MLB adopted an expanded replay review system; in 2015, the birth of the
challenge system allowed managers to directly challenge umpires’ calls and, if successful,
overturn them. The league was late to adopt this rule compared to other professional sports, but it
“opened the door into a [brand-new] arena of statistical analysis over 50 years in the making.”
(Imber) This makes strategy much more meaningful because an overturned call at the right time
can swing momentum and potentially make the difference between victory and defeat.
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Another new tactic is the defensive shift, which is when players abandon their ordinary
positions to cover different parts of the field. Teams do this under the guidance of statistics that
show particular parts of the field where certain players hit the ball more often. Managers also
induce specific pitcher-hitter matchups more frequently thanks to data showing head-to-head
advantages in certain situations. For example, a manager calling in a left-handed pitcher to throw
against a left-handed hitter is an attempt to capitalize on a same-handed hitter-pitcher matchup
that typically favors pitchers who can bend breaking balls away from hitters rather than towards
them.
Moreover, teams have turned their franchises around from bad to good with the help of
sabermetrics. The 2004 Boston Red Sox are one notable analytic-driven turnaround in the postMoneyball era. The franchise had not won a World Series championship since 1918 nor made an
appearance since 1986, and the superstitious “Curse of the Bambino” loomed over Boston for a
long time. When Larry Lucchino became the team president in 2001, he hired Theo Epstein, the
youngest general manager in MLB history, shortly before John Henry bought the Red Sox in
2002. After that season, the Red Sox hired Bill James as a senior advisor on Baseball Operations,
symbolizing an embrace of analytics in this reconstruction of the front office. Two years later,
they won the 2004 World Series and snapped their 86-year drought. James stayed with the Red
Sox until the end of the 2019 season and saw them win four World Series titles—the last one
occurring in 2018. A change in leadership guided by a statistic-minded philosophy led to a nearly
immediate positive turnaround and reversal of fortune in Boston.
Outside of the stadium, the explosion of fantasy sports turned fans into coaches by
simulating managers’ daily decisions with less pressure than the real job. In fantasy baseball
leagues, anyone can draft rosters comprising players from different MLB teams in hopes of
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building and managing championship-winning teams. League members can also negotiate trades
with others in advance of trade deadlines just like MLB clubs. The optional added incentive of
prize money also makes people try harder by using statistics to make smarter draft-day and startor-sit decisions throughout the long season.
Another major off-field application of statistics is sports betting, which became legal in
the United States on May 14, 2018, after the Supreme Court lifted the federal ban in a six-tothree decision. (Licata) As of August 2019, forty-two states had legalized or moved towards
legalizing sports betting; the map below depicts where states were in that process at the time:
(Licata)

Oddsmakers calculate and predict outcomes of various sporting events, and sportsbooks
can get intricate with MLB because there is much downtime in between pitches for bets to take
shape before any action occurs. Fans can place wagers on the results of games, or they can dive
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deeper in numerous ways. Betting against the spread involves picking teams to win by a certain
number of runs determined by sportsbooks who use encyclopedias of statistics to establish
favorites and estimate how many runs they should win by. Over/under totals are estimates of
how many runs will be scored in games. Several in-game bets can be placed as well, including
how many hits players will record, how many strikeouts pitchers will amass, predicting the next
pitch or its outcome, how many homeruns will occur, and several other possibilities with the
multitude of things that can happen after each pitch. Insights that identify smarter bets aren’t
reached without the assistance of statistics, which sports betting operators like DraftKings and
FanDuel need volumes of in order to facilitate fantasy sports contests and other creative betting
opportunities. Big data is bigger than ever with legalized sports betting, as “the total sports
betting revenue in the U.S. reached over one and a half billion U.S. dollars” in 2019. (Lock) In a
nutshell, dynamic analytics and baseball will long coexist in the modern world.
However, amid the wonders and genius of analytics lie some detrimental effects that have
presented themselves over the years. One such effect is slowing the game down by inducing
more stoppages in addition to those built into the sport when managers make nitpick tactical
moves that impede the flow of the sport. Off the field, executives are leaning on statistics to
handle finances using data that suggests when players will become less productive in the future
(rather than paying players based on proven performance). This is enhancing the microscope on
players and redirecting money from their pockets to other team expenses. While statistics help
players learn more about their strengths and weaknesses and those of their opponents, front
offices are learning just as much. Although, statistics of recent seasons show how this is a
steadily unhealthy trend for MLB: the surge of homeruns, extra-base hits, and strikeouts are
powerful examples of data pushing its limits.
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All in all, sabermetrics holds a strong grasp on baseball by molding the style of play and
how fans can engage in the sport. There have been positive and negative effects of analytics,
some taking longer than others to materialize. Nonetheless, it is important to understand the
current state of MLB so that it can improve for everyone involved. Big data will continue to
facilitate decision-making on several levels, but there is such a thing as too many numbers. With
that being said, MLB must contain analytics’ control over the sport to enable a healthy influence
on the game without ruining the experience. Although, even with experimental rule changes that
MLB can test in response to public unrest, there is only so much they can do to redirect the
course of the sport. Whether it meant to or not, MLB contributed to enduring concerns that have
altered the nature of baseball as we know it. The most apparent illustration of this drastic turn
can be found in an explosive growth of strikeouts, homeruns, and extra-base hits that show no
signs of slowing down for as long as MLB encourages it.
Can’t Spell MLB Without “K”
While analytics have benefitted all MLB players, staff, and front offices, there is a case to
be made that nobody has yielded stronger effects on performance from the diverse applications
and insights of data than pitchers. Considering that hitters cannot do anything until pitchers make
their deliveries, everything that unfolds on the field comes down to whether or not pitchers can
sneak the ball past hitters. In an era driven by intelligent and actionable data, pitchers dictate the
flow of baseball with a rippling effect that cuts much deeper than what fans see every game. The
fallout from a league-wide strikeout rate that has increased every season since 2008 has created a
controversial brand of baseball such that “The strikeout dilemma has MLB officials deeply
concerned given it is the primary reason for the game’s sluggish pace of play and its troublesome
lack of action on certain nights.” (Rogers, Kurkjian) By far, the strikeout phenomenon is the
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game’s biggest ailment as pitchers have access to next-level data and managers employ strategies
that make pitchers more dominant.
Evidence of the plethora of strikeouts is easy to see through several historic statistics. The
first few months of the 2021 regular season alone saw records fall in the face of unprecedented
pitcher consistency and dominance:
[Shane] Bieber struck out more batters (68) through April than any other pitcher in
history. He set a ... record for consecutive starts (20) with at least eight strikeouts...
[Jacob] DeGrom set a record for strikeouts (48) through the first four starts of a season
and tied [Nolan] Ryan’s record for strikeouts (59) through the first five starts. Corbin
Burnes of the Brewers set a record for 58 strikeouts between walks ... that record was
broken four days later by Gerrit Cole, who ... made it 61 strikeouts between walks.
Burnes still holds the... record for strikeouts (56) to start a season before issuing his first
walk. Yankees closer Aroldis Chapman struck out 29 in his first 12 innings. He struck out
nine batters for every hit allowed, but it still wasn’t the best strikeout-to-hit ratio in the
game. (Kurkjian)
Just as analytics gradually emerged onto the scene, so did the strikeouts. While pitchers are
reaching new heights, the league has seen a multitude of signs to suggest that something like this
was coming. Numerous other strange, but true, statistics illuminate the growth of strikeouts:
There were 94 100-strikeout seasons [for players] from 1900 to 1963. But in 2019, the
last full, 162-game season before COVID-19 shortened the 2020 season, a sobering 171
players struck out 100 times. (Kurkjian)
In 1989, no pitcher had a start of 12 strikeouts and no walks. In 1990, there was one. It
happened 24 times in 2019. (Kurkjian)
From 1900 to 1960, only 22 times did a team win a game despite its hitters striking out
15 times. In 2019, it happened 46 times. ... In 2020, the Tigers became the first team ever
to win a game striking out 25 times. (Kurkjian)
In Game 7 of the 1960 World Series in which the Pirates beat the Yankees 10-9, there
were no strikeouts. But in Game 1 of the Reds-Braves [2020] wild-card series... that went
13 innings, there were a combined 37 strikeouts. (Kurkjian)
In the 1980s, there were, on average, nine strikeouts per game. Now there are twice as
many. In baseball history, there have been four games in which the teams combined for
six or fewer hits and at least 30 strikeouts. One of those games happened in 2015, one in
2018 and two in April [2021]. (Kurkjian)

Sorgi 25
Days after the Phillies became the first team since 1996 to score two runs on a strikeout,
the Orioles’ John Means became the first pitcher to throw a no-hitter without a walk, hit
batter or error. The only baserunner came on a strikeout/wild pitch. (Kurkjian)
In April [2021], there were 1,092 more strikeouts than hits, the largest such gap in any
month in [MLB] history. ... In 2016, the percentage of plate appearances that ended in a
strikeout was .211. It has risen, year by year -- .216, .223, .230, .234. [On May 19, 2021],
it stands at .243. Those are... the six highest rates in [MLB] history. In 1968, the famed
Year of the Pitcher, the K rate was only .158. (Kurkjian)
[In June 2021], the league-wide strikeout rate is hovering around 25%. To put that into
context, that is the same as the career strikeout rates of Sandy Koufax and Nolan Ryan.
On average, every pitcher is performing like two of the best of all time. (Rogers)
One main reason that strikeouts are increasingly normal occurrences is that pitchers are
built stronger and smarter than ever before. The sport has seen many talented arms, but never
such high league-wide average velocity. The past decade has shown tremendous change in
velocity that makes it very difficult for hitters: “The average velocity for a four-seam fastball is
94; 10 years ago, it was 89. ... The difference between a [90-mph] fastball and 95 mph is night
and day. The difference between 85 and 100 is a completely different game.” (Kurkjian) This
uptick in velocity gives hitters less time to decide whether to swing at a pitch and forces them to
swing harder and faster just to make contact. Velocity was not always a point of emphasis
because it was not always widely publicized; as this changed, it forced hitters to study data of
pitchers’ velocities, spin rates, and pitch selection in particular situations. Data reveals
information about pitchers’ past tendencies, but it has minimal bearing on what pitchers will do
in the future. At best, it becomes an educated guessing game that happens in the blink of an eye
and “will always favor the man with the ball. The pitcher is proactive in the relationship, while
the hitter is reactive. That’s not going to change.” (Rogers) The other source of adversity for
hitters lies in the fact that fastballs are not the only pitches gaining velocity.
While fastballs are becoming faster, breaking balls are not too far behind. Sliders, cutters,
curveballs, changeups, splitters, or combinations of these pitches often mess with the minds of
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hitters with elusive speed and movement. Long-time infielder Ryan Zimmerman has been
playing since 2005 and can attest to the source of trouble for hitters that lies in the off-speed:
‘The secondary stuff is so ridiculous, and [pitchers] can throw it at any time; that’s what
makes it so hard to hit,’ ... ‘These guys throw 95, 98 mph, but they only throw their
fastball 40% of the time. It’s the combination of them throwing all their pitches in any
count from the beginning. You used to have guys try to go through the lineup first time
through throwing only a fastball. But now, from the first batter on, you might get the
whole arsenal because if they get to 100 pitches, they are lucky.’ (Kurkjian)
Pitchers can maximize the potential of their pitches by manipulating the spin rate and learning
more about what their arms are capable of. Regular studies of statistics such as pitch velocity,
movement, and usage rate show pitchers which types of pitches are effective and enables them to
control their arsenals to surrender as few baserunners as possible.
On the other hand, even with advanced analytics at their disposal, hitters are somewhat
helpless because “The remarkable amount of analytic data and ... technological advances have
greatly helped pitchers improve arm speed, velocity, spin rate, etc.” such that hitters are typically
a step behind pitchers. (Kurkjian) Jason Ochart, Philadelphia Phillies minor league hitting
instructor and director of hitting at Driveline, a renowned baseball player development program,
adds that “ ‘A pitcher’s development, the ability to leverage information and technology, has
outraced the hitters significantly’ ... ‘Pitchers are using all this information to optimize an arsenal
and a strategy against hitters.’ ” (Kurkjian) Hitting a baseball in MLB is one of the hardest things
to do in professional sports, so this deeper mental puzzle makes it wonderous how offenses can
score any runs when star pitchers are performing at elite levels.
Another reason why pitchers are increasingly effective is redefined objectives for starters
and relievers that have made their arsenals much more elusive. Starters’ pitch counts and innings
are tightly regulated by managers today, but before pitch count data was first tracked in 1988,
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managers felt less pressure to pull starting pitchers because longer outings put less stress on
bullpens that worked every game (as opposed to starters that pitched every five days). Every
MLB season from 1988 to 2015 saw at least 100 complete games, signifying the magnitude of
durability. Since 2017, no season has seen 60 complete games. (Major League Pitching Year-byYear Averages) Once teams put more thought into limiting runs, durability took a backseat to
effectiveness and strikeouts. Now, pitchers are asked to get hitters out with whatever it takes
rather than conserve their arms long enough to see more of them. This strategy instigates more
strenuous nightly efforts for bullpens, but that is not always a bad thing with several relievers on
MLB rosters. The following figures visualize this ongoing trend that goes back over a century
(Silver, Keri and Paine, Jaffe):

Sorgi 28

Starting Pitcher Performance 2015-20
Change
K%
BB%
HR/9
ERA

Season

IP/GS

ERA-

FIP

FIP-

2015

5.81

-2.61%

19.5%

7.1%

1.06

4.10

103

4.03

102

2016

5.65

-2.8%

20.2%

7.7%

1.24

4.34

104

4.30

103

2017

5.51

-2.4%

20.6%

8.1%

1.34

4.49

103

4.48

103

2018

5.36

-2.8%

21.6%

8.0%

1.21

4.19

101

4.21

101

2019

5.18

-3.4%

22.3%

7.7%

1.44

4.54

101

4.51

100

2020
4.73
-8.7%
23.2%
*2020 data through August 5, 2020.

8.6%

1.28

4.13

101

4.13

101

Length of Starts, 2015-2020
1.1-2
2.1-3
3.1-4

4.1-5

≥5.1

Season

≤1

2015

0.7%

1.8%

3.5%

6.3%

19.3%

68.4%

2016

0.8%

2.0%

3.6%

7.8%

21.8%

64.0%

2017

0.8%

2.0%

4.4%

9.4%

22.6%

60.8%

2018

2.0%

3.1%

4.4%

9.7%

23.8%

57.1%

2019

3.0%

4.0%

5.4%

10.5%

24.9%

52.2%

2020
1.8%
5.4%
*2020 data through August 5, 2020.

8.7%

19.3%

25.6%

39.2%
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Early Season Starting Pitcher Workloads and Performance, 2015-20
GS IP/GS Change TBF/GS Change Pitches/GS Change ERA-

FIP-

2015

338

5.72

-2.1%

24.2

-2.4%

91.3

-4.1%

102

103

2016

332

5.67

-0.9%

24.1

-0.4%

92.9

1.7%

98

96

2017

342

5.56

-1.8%

23.5

-2.5%

90.6

-2.4%

92

99

2018

324

5.38

-3.3%

22.9

-2.4%

89.5

-1.2%

96

100

2019

334

5.20

-3.4%

22.1

-3.6%

86.7

-3.2%

95

98

19.8

-10.4%

77.8

-10.2%

101

101

Season

2020
332 4.73
-9.0%
*2020 data through August 5, 2020.

Factors that encourage managers to use more pitchers include pitch count management
(whether recovering from injury or simply managing workloads), reducing familiarity of any
particular pitcher for the opponent, an abundance of serviceable players to step into the role, and
strikeouts. When starters don’t pitch deep into games, they can exert more effort into each pitch
knowing that the manager might pull them at any moment, which is increasingly quicker:
The average starting pitcher threw 95 pitches per start from 2001 to 2015. From 2016 to
2020, that number dropped to 89. Leaving a starter in long enough to face the same
lineup for a third time has now evolved into heresy for all but the very best. The pitchers
themselves have gradually relented, a begrudging acceptance that numbers cannot be
defeated. Rather than engage in an unwinnable fight, they have attempted to use the
strategy to their benefit -- by not being afraid to showcase all their pitches in early atbats, by dismissing the idea of setting up hitters for the late stages of a game and... by
going as close to max effort as possible. (ESPN.com)
Former baseball executive Theo Epstein, who was responsible for analytic-based turnarounds
with the Boston Red Sox and Chicago Cubs that ended eighty-six and 108-year World Series
droughts, explains the converted mentality of the starting pitcher:
‘If you asked a starting pitcher thirty years ago, ‘What’s your job?’ he’d say to finish this
game or get close to it,’ ... ‘If you ask some starting pitchers now... fewer would say my
job is to get deep into the game. It’s more, ‘I want to be as effective as possible, miss as
many bats as possible, strike out as many as possible, and if the manager has to come get
me in the fifth or sixth inning, so be it. We literally have eight to nine guys in the pen that
can throw 98 mph and punch some guys out and finish the game.’’ (Kurkjian)
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MLB rosters comprise twenty-six players with no limit to how many pitchers teams can
carry. Typically, teams have about twelve to thirteen position players and thirteen to fourteen
pitchers, so five-man starting rotations leave about eight to nine relievers that can enter games
with fresh arms and throw as hard as (if not harder than) their predecessors. The strategy of using
many relievers in games disables opponents from becoming familiar with any pitcher’s arsenal
and elevates average velocity to keep it difficult for hitters to put balls into play. The following
figure illustrates the spike of relief pitchers throwing at average speeds of 95 mph or faster from
2002 to 2014 and emphasizes how dominant bullpens increase the league-wide strikeout rate:
(Keri and Paine)

In response to this adjustment by managers and pitching staffs, hitters had to undergo one
of their own to not look completely impotent at the plate. They not only have to worry about
getting the bat around quickly, but also finding open places to hit the ball. With more defensive
shifts, that task becomes difficult when fielders abandon their original positions to areas where
the ball is more likely to be hit. Before the shift was born, “left-handed batters [had] more
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favorable matchups because they face right-handed pitching more than righties do left-handed
pitching. Then came along the shift, and [lefty] hitters suddenly became vulnerable.”
(ESPN.com) While righty hitters can beat out ground balls to the hole near shortstop, lefty hitters
have to deal with more infielders on the right side of second base. Shifts have considerably
increased since they were first tracked in 2016, and more so for left-handed hitters than righthanded hitters: (“MLB Team Fielder Positioning”)
TOTAL

vs. RIGHT-HANDED HITTERS

vs. LEFT-HANDED HITTERS

Year

PA

Shifts

Shift %

PA

Shifts

Shift %

PA

Shifts

Shift %

2021

180199

55595

30.9

107506

17395

16.2

72693

38200

52.5

2020

66180

22549

34.1

37925

8208

21.6

28255

14341

50.8

2019

184392

47178

25.6

108892

15548

14.3

75500

31630

41.9

2018

183433

31927

17.4

108123

9597

8.9

75310

22330

29.7

2017

183135

22143

12.1

108084

5574

5.2

75051

16569

22.1

2016

179121

24464

13.7

105184

6516

6.2

73937

17948

24.3

As defenses commit to shifts and close off gaps for hits, this prompts a stronger effort
from hitters to elevate the ball over the shift. Launch angle, exit velocity, and slug percentage are
among the most preached statistics because contact hits up the middle now play into shifts and
induce easier outs. Long-time catcher Stephen Vogt can attest to the hitter’s reshaped mentality
that guides the effort to counter shifts: “ ‘There is no more shortening up and making contact.
We are being told to drive the ball. We are using our ‘A’ swing on every pitch. When [teams] are
preaching slugging and driving the ball, the pitchers are trying to strike you out. It’s the perfect
storm. ... Shortening up and putting the ball in play is rarely spoken of today.’ ” (Kurkjian) Ryan
Zimmerman agrees with the futility of poking hits where fielders aren’t because shifts defeat that
purpose: “ ‘The balls that used to sneak up the middle, and... through the 6-hole, those don’t exist
anymore... So you try to hit it over the shift. You might as well try to get an extra-base hit, but
extra-base hits lead to more strikeouts.’ ” (Kurkjian) Hitters are adopting a homerun-or-strikeout
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philosophy and accepting strikeouts in the pursuit of homeruns and extra-base hits because
“analytics say a strikeout is nothing more than an out, no less damaging than a weak ground ball
to the second baseman. And it’s better than hitting into a double play.” (Kurkjian) There is less
humiliation in striking out because it is inevitable when hitters are trying to—and succeeding
in—hitting more homeruns and extra base hits.
Extra Distance and Extra Bases
Approaches centered around launch angle, exit velocity, slugging percentage, and other
metrics that encourage power-hitting are achieving positive results for hitters through recordhigh homerun totals. The top teams on MLB’s all-time single-season homerun list reveal an
increasingly transparent trend in modern baseball: (Thornburg and Kelly)
Rk

Year Team

Homeruns

1

2019 Tw ins

307

2

2019 Yankees

306

3

2019 Astros

288

4

2019 Dodgers

279

5

2018 Yankees

267

6

1997 Mariners

264

7

2005 Rangers

260

T8

2019 Athletics

257

T8

2010 Blue Jays

257

T8

1996 Orioles

257

One noteworthy observation is how each of the top five teams are from 2018 or later, and the
2019 season alone comprises half of the list. The 1997 Seattle Mariners held an MLB record of
264 homeruns for twenty-one years, but then the 2018 New York Yankees that passed the
Mariners were outdone by four teams (including themselves) the following season. (Thornburg
and Kelly) This data points to an exponential growth of homeruns that has become a natural, yet
captivating, side effect of the spike in strikeouts. With fewer contact hitters, the frequency and
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distance of high-flying hits are soaring as players meticulously craft and practice swings with the
perfect launch angle to maintain some consistency with big hits.
Although, the ball does not have to sail over the fence for players to yield desired results,
as evidenced by an inflation of extra-base hits. At-bats where hitters swing for optimal launch
angles and don’t strike out result in either homeruns, deep fly balls that stay in play, pop-outs
that elevate the ball too much, or ground balls that don’t elevate the ball at all. The four classes
of batted balls and associated launch angles are pop ups (greater than fifty degrees), fly balls
(twenty-five to fifty degrees), line drives (ten to twenty-five degrees), and ground balls (less than
ten degrees). (Launch Angle (LA)) Players routinely feed into this boom-or-bust possibility under
the idea that big hits outweigh the cost of striking out even though the latter happens much more
often than the former. While doubles and triples have seen general declines as of late, statistics
spanning the last decade provide evidence of the steadying normality of extra-base hits and their
impact on other metrics of interest: (2021 Major League Baseball Season Summary)
Year

Hits

2B

3B

HR

XBH

% XBH

SO

BA

OBP

SLG

OPS

2021

1316

262

22

198

482

0.366

1405

0.244

0.317

0.411

0.728

2020

481

94

8

77

179

0.372

520

0.245

0.322

0.418

0.740

2019

1401

284

26

226

536

0.383

1427

0.252

0.323

0.435

0.758

2018

1367

275

28

186

489

0.358

1374

0.248

0.318

0.409

0.728

2017

1407

280

27

204

511

0.363

1337

0.255

0.324

0.426

0.750

2016

1409

275

29

187

491

0.348

1299

0.255

0.322

0.417

0.739

2015

1404

275

31

164

470

0.335

1248

0.254

0.317

0.405

0.721

2014

1387

271

28

140

439

0.317

1248

0.251

0.314

0.386

0.700

2013

1403

274

26

155

455

0.324

1224

0.253

0.318

0.396

0.714

2012

1402

275

31

164

470

0.335

1214

0.255

0.319

0.405

0.724

2011

1409

280

30

152

462

0.328

1150

0.255

0.321

0.399

0.720

This table contains yearly average batting statistics, including ratios of average extra-base
hits to total hits. One significant takeaway from this data is that every season from 2015 to 2021
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saw at least one-third of hits result in extra bases, meaning that the goal of hitting the ball out of
shifts’ reach is being met. Hitting for contact is seldom the plan of attack as power-hitting and
smooth swings are widely promoted over their respective counterparts. Hitters are putting more
time and effort into perfecting their swings, though it is becoming difficult to find diversity in
hitters’ swings because they “have beautiful swings, but... only one swing. If a pitcher throws it
in his bat path, the hitter doesn’t just hit a line-drive single to left field. He hits it 20 rows up. But
if the pitcher identifies and avoids that one bat path, he doesn’t just get him out, he strikes him
out.” (Kurkjian) This factors into the reformed mindset of each plate appearance by helping
hitters come to terms with pitchers’ dominance in at-bats that become tests of not just wit, but
survival. Traditional methodologies have little space in today’s game as analytics establish a new
league identity that redefines our understanding of the sport. How MLB chooses to handle the
controversy surrounding the widespread ripple effect of analytics will be interesting to see, but
they are certainly trying their best with a slew of looming challenges on their plate.
What’s Next for MLB
The future of baseball hangs in the balance of MLB’s assessment of its state of flux. As
analytics progressively ingrain a go-big-or-go-home style of play with little room in between, the
league is forced to confront important questions and options to alleviate public dismay over what
has become of the sport. The consensus on the state of MLB wants a brand of baseball that is
more resemblant of the values that boosted its popularity before the data age, and the league is
actively listening to an audience that speaks with a clear and unified message:
Major League Baseball has spent a lot of time and energy asking fans what version of the
game they like the most. The results have given those in charge of the sport a clear
mandate that leaving the game as is simply [isn’t] an option. No fan is voting for more
strikeouts. Or time between pitches. Or more pitching changes. ... ‘three favorites at
games are triples, doubles and stolen bases.’ All three are down across MLB. (Rogers)
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Baseball knows what it cannot be, but it is asking a lot to change what MLB stands for in a flash.
Experiments are underway to combat concerns regarding pace of play, length of games, lack of
hits, and other topics that circle back to the heightened homerun and extra-base hit tolls across
the league. Minor League Baseball has become a sizeable platform for MLB to test different
theories and proposals.
One such test lies in moving the pitching mound back by one foot to sixty-one feet, six
inches, which MLB exercised in the independent Pioneer League. The theory here is that pushing
the pitching mound back will aid hitters’ reaction times and increase opportunity to make more
contact against higher velocities. (Rogers) However, this compromises the sacred nature of the
sixty-feet, six-inch pitching mound measurement that has become a staple of the sport. A second
test involves making the bases bigger, which was used in Triple-A baseball this season; this rule
change “could have an immense impact on everything from the number of infield hits and stolen
bases to rosters more balanced between power hitters and those capable of taking an extra base.”
(Rogers) It would benefit hitters in close plays at bases by providing more space to evade tags or
beat out dribbling infield hits while encouraging small-ball tactics that would provide changes of
pace from homeruns or strikeouts.
Another rule under testing is regulating defensive shifts, which may bring about a doubleedged sword if implemented beyond Double-A baseball. More contact hits would occur, but the
rule may also open a can of worms impacting future generations: “Regulating the shift... will
undoubtedly affect how many balls that currently end up in a fielder’s glove get through for hits.
But it could also fundamentally change a part of baseball. It might not just mean more baseballs
getting through to the outfield, it could alter swing paths and habits of players and even the type
of prospects teams [that] target in the draft.” (Rogers) A once genius tactic to reduce hits raced to
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levels of usage that are widely perceived as excessive or too far removed from the authentic feel
of baseball. Moreover, growing discontent with umpire performance launched a call for robotic
umpires to iron out inconsistencies with the strike zone. Be that as it may, the intention of
correcting calls behind the plate would be just the beginning of what robotic umpires would
accomplish. Theo Epstein claims: “ ‘You’re seeing the ABS [automated balls and strikes] being
used in the low minors... because with that comes the potential to change the strike zone to one
that is optimal for contact,’ ... ‘Different strike zones lead to different styles of play.’ ” (Rogers)
Reconfiguring the strike zone carries game-changing implications, which is why using minor
leagues as guineas pigs is ideal for this theory to weigh all of the effects and determine if it is
appropriate for the big diamond.
Everything is in play as MLB gauges the feasibility of several possible fixes to prevalent
problems within the game. In that comes opportunity for creative thinking with a safety net that
prevents premature results from materializing on the field. MLB must not change everything, but
rather be careful and selective in bringing about meaningful (positive) change. One thing MLB
knows is that the future of the sport hangs in the balance of their conduct in the present:
The past and the future intersect in the present, and baseball’s present is confusing... This
is the time to examine not only what baseball is now but also what it wants to be... that’s
the sort of thing that will drive the decision-makers, the people who are supposed to be
the game’s stewards. For... all of its foibles, baseball’s greatness remains on display every
night, from April to October. It is the century-old house with good bones. But upgrades
are necessary. Change is imperative. And it’s incumbent on all the game’s stakeholders,
from those on the field to those in the ivory towers to those in the stands, to find a shared
vision that best fits the modern expectation of what a professional sports league can and
should look like. (ESPN.com)
Amid the depth behind record-breaking strikeout, homerun, and extra-base hit totals—and the
role of analytics in these transformative trends—MLB has become a fascinating case study
through no intent of its own. Statistics and technology provided the tools for teams to redefine
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the standard of professional baseball and challenge some of the major pillars that the game has
long been built on. Any course of action that MLB pursues will certainly involve data in its cause
and/or effects as analytics will continue to clench a strong hold on America’s national pastime.
Conclusion
Statistics have rewritten the script of MLB—most markedly in the twenty-first century—
and revolutionized how the mind visualizes, follows, and plays the game. Anyone can easily tap
into an analytical side of baseball that is opening up new opportunities on and off the field. Data
sits at the forefront of innovation reflected in enhanced player performance, managerial intellect,
front office awareness, and fan engagement. However, early proponents of statistical analysis in
baseball did not need the technology that we have today to extract the value of statistics. While
machine power enables greater distribution and consumption of big data, it was never necessary
to identify the underlying messages of statistics and give them practical meaning and importance
in the sport. Henry Chadwick, Allan Roth, Bill James, and several others in and around their time
recognized the intelligence and actionable nature of baseball statistics without the presence or
capabilities of modern technology.
Although, a major caveat of combining deeper analytics and MLB in a tech-savvy world
lies in data’s seemingly limitless functionality and versatility. It is understandable to ponder and
test the bounds of big data, but people must not forget the intangible factors that gave rise to the
analytical revolution in the first place. Genuine brainpower laid the groundwork for statistical
analysis, but is growingly overlooked for automated techniques to learn more about the game.
The IQ of players, team personnel, and spectators have become vastly more aware and intuitive,
but recent trends across MLB are showing how it is possible to have too much of a good thing.
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Homeruns, strikeouts, extra-base hits, and a multitude of proposals to restructure a sport in
extraordinary flux call for a step back to truly comprehend what is happening in baseball.
Many of the challenges currently facing MLB circle back to how the league has chosen to
incorporate analytics into its operations. The beginning of the twenty-first century marked a clear
turning point in the purpose that statistics served, which was reflected through many positive and
negative consequences of a dynamic transformation of MLB. It is virtually impossible to restrict
the league’s access to big data because it is available on too many platforms to fully regulate,
which is why patience and open-mindedness are essential towards creating a desirable version of
MLB different from what we are witnessing.
In that spirit, it is important to understand that the solutions that MLB and its fans want
will unlikely come to fruition in an elegant manner any time soon. Not only is today’s style of
play appealing to pitchers and hitters on the field, but the example that the league is setting for
upcoming generations is quite impressionable in that Little League players idolize the flash and
sensation of today’s young stars. Additionally, growing up in a world that will likely have more
advanced technology than this one will make it harder to not be attracted to cutting-edge
analytics that so profoundly expand the baseball mind-space as it is. Data will hold a firm place
in baseball for a long time, though it will always be within control to check how far it goes in
dictating the brand of baseball produced and its effects on how everyone can experience it.
Regardless of what MLB and the future standard of baseball become, moderation is key
towards creating a version of the sport that appeases everyone. The league must not cave to the
pressure of producing substantial change immediately because there may be bigger implications
at stake that cannot be realized until they ensue on the field. Using Minor League Baseball as an
experimental platform is smart and resourceful for testing various ideas because it preserves the
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current nature of MLB if they don’t pan out well in the minors. Grievances cited from Tripleand Double-A leagues can be duly noted by MLB for future reference with what does or doesn’t
work in real-life.
It is clear that the decisions that MLB makes now will shape its long-term future. That is
where research and questioning like that of this paper will continually serve an integral role in
controlling that future. I originally took on this topic of research because of my personal
attachment to baseball, but developing a greater understanding of the depth behind statistics and
the consequences of how people use data has powerfully revealed the greater stakes at play. As
long as humans remain curious to test the bounds of what is possible—not just in baseball, but
society altogether—reflection and self-restraint will remain vital in knowing where we are to
properly understand where we can or should go. History has undoubtedly shown that analytics
and baseball can coexist, and continued investigation into the relationship between the two will
aid people’s efforts in maximizing what the sport can become for players, managers, executives,
and fans everywhere.
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